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1. Introduction 
One of the major consequences of transformations brought about by the Second 
Demographic Transition is the passage from traditional to modern family forms. In particular, the 
ancient division of roles between members of the couple is often replaced by a more or less equal 
sharing of roles (both members participate in the labor market and in housework). In this new 
context, fertility choices have to be re-discussed, and the factors affecting fertility acquire new 
meanings. Female wages and salaries, for example, do not have a clear impact on fertility outcomes: 
on the one hand an higher income makes it easier to face the high costs of caring for children, but 
on the other hand working women have a reduced time for looking after children. This situation 
makes fertility and job choices highly competing with each other, and therefore endogenous as 
suggested also by Hotz et al. (1997): women with a high commitment to children will invest less 
time in the labor market thus limiting their earning potential and vice versa. Family policies can 
mitigate such a “competition” between job and family roles, making conciliation between them 
easier. 
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This clearly emerges if we consider two countries which are highly different as far as family 
policies are concerned: France and Italy. The French welfare regime is, in fact, a paragon in Europe 
for supporting parenthood, strongly encouraging childbearing and ensuring a widespread and 
accessible childcare service. Italy, instead, offers a very poor support to families’ fertility 
aspirations and access to the childcare system is quite limited. The result of these different 
situations is quite evident at the macro level: in France fertility rate reaches the highest levels 
among European countries and female employment rate is relatively high. Italy, instead, shares with 
Spain the lowest TFR in Europe (1.25) and female employment rate is rather low. 
In this work we want to investigate the determinants of this pattern at the micro level. 
Fertility is jointly modelled with labor force participation with possibly correlated unobserved 
heterogeneities. The paper is organized as follows. The next section gives an overview of empirical 
literature on competition between family and job career. Section 3 compares French and Italian 
welfare state, with particular attention to family policies. Section 4 describes the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP) and the sub-sample used in our analysis, whereas section 5 
outlines the statistical model of fertility and labor force participation. In section 6 we discuss 
empirical results and in section 7 we provide some concluding remarks. 
2.  Fertility and female labor participation 
The relationship between fertility choices and female participation in the labor market is not that 
clear. In last decades many countries experienced a rapid growth in female employment rates as 
well as a decrease in fertility rates, but this trend is not uniform in all developed countries. In fact 
the countries with an higher level of female labor participation are the ones which maintain 
relatively high fertility rates (Ahn and Mira, 1999; Brewster and Rindfuss, 2000; Engelhardt and 
Prskawetz, 2002).  
Possible explanations of the declining of fertility when women participate in the labor 
market are given by the theory. In last decades deep transformation in the family structure and 
organization have been produced by a change in value orientations, also holding changes in 
demographic behaviour. For instance, the emergence of individualisation, post-materialist values, 
symmetric gender roles and female emancipation (see for example Lesthaeghe and Meekers, 1986) 
corresponded in economic terms to a shift from the aim of maximising the household utility to 
maximising individual needs. While in traditional societies individuals had to maximise household 
utility as a whole and specialisation of task and division of roles (women rearing children and 
husband working) was the optimal strategy, in modern societies this does not hold anymore. 
Individualisation, symmetric gender roles and female emancipation lead to redefine internal roles 
and to shift from the maximisation of an household utility function to the negotiation between 
members acting on the base of distinct utility functions (Ott, 1995; Berhman, 1997). In this 
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framework, the bargaining power of each partner becomes crucial: each individual has to try to 
improve his/her position within the couple depending on his/her alternatives outside the family: 
who is in the best position outside the family has a better insurance against the split of the couple, 
and therefore gains more power in the negotiation process. 
The consequences of this new perspective on fertility decision and female participation in 
the labor market are straightforward: on the one hand, for a woman having a job or investing in 
human capital accumulation becomes crucial for increasing her bargaining power. On the other 
hand, fertility decision becomes more difficult: since none of the bargainers would agree to an 
outcome that is lower than his/her payoff, disagreement may result in continuing current situation 
without any change. For instance, this may be the case in fertility decision. Indeed, while in general 
having children would increase household utility, as a secondary effect it would decrease the female 
utility of becoming single again (in case of split the female position would get worse on average), 
causing a drop in her bargaining power.  
In this new context, having a child requires a careful evaluation of individual opportunity 
and costs, which may be particularly severe for women, since most of them have to leave paid work 
for some period of time around birth (Brewster and Rindfuss, 2000). The human capital model 
(Becker, 1993) measures female costs for having children as forgone earnings due to childbirth (for 
the mothers). Those can be disjointed in forgone earnings while caring for a child, since the woman 
has to spend some time out of the labor market, forgone returns to work experience, which 
corresponds to the fact that while taking care of children the working experience does not improve, 
and even forgone earnings due to a de-evaluation of human capital, because when a mother re-
entries in the labor force will receive a lower wage than she received before quitting the job, and 
moreover often, if interruption occurred, proceeding in the career is harder (Gustaffson, 1999). 
Regards to foregone earnings, Joshi (2002) found that highly educated women experience the 
smallest relative loss of earnings at motherhood, probably due to the fact that they had the best 
chance in choosing a suitable job, allowing its conciliation with fertility and may even afford the 
costs of unsubsidised private child care service. This is compatible with Brewster and Rindfuss 
(2000) findings assessing that in most countries women who are highly educated or hold jobs that 
require long training periods are less likely to leave paid work, and whenever this happens they 
return more quickly. Nevertheless, their delay in motherhood is very strong.  
According to this idea of evaluation of opportunity costs, several empirical papers find a 
positive effect on fertility of male incomes and negative effects of female wages (see for example 
Devaney, 1983; Heckman and Walker, 1990): for this reason female wages are seen to have both an 
income and substitution effect on fertility, while male wages only exert an income effect. In details, 
the income effect implies that when income increases, even the demand for goods increases, as well 
as the demand for children; the substitution effect refers more directly to the opportunity costs, 
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predicting that if female wages increase, it is more expensive to rear children (because mothers need 
to quit job at least for a short time period), thus dampening fertility.  
In fact, we have to underline that this problem of conciliating childcare and economically 
productive work (known in the literature as maternal role incompatibility hypothesis, Stycos and 
Weller, 1967), rose with industrialisation. While in developing countries the organisation of both 
production and childcare, especially the availability of inexpensive and reliable parental surrogates, 
determined a low level of conflict between working and mothering (Mason and Palan, 1981; Castro 
Martin, 1985), in developed countries this is no longer true. Labor, in the industrial organisation of 
production, is organised to favour the interests of employers more than the interests of households; 
women have to work in factory, office or store where children are not welcome and time schedule is 
rarely flexible. Since it has become more difficult to have children with one single income 
(Murphy, 1992, underlines reviewing some recent empirical finding for Sweden, Poland, U.S.S.R.) 
the incompatibility become a serious problem.  
Availability of more flexible time schedules (as for instance part-time jobs), a functional 
child care support, and economic support to families who want to have a child, can make this 
conflict less sharp, increasing compatibility between parental role and working career. These are 
probably among the reason why, at the macro level the relationship between fertility and female 
employment rates in developed countries is changing, turning from negative to positive (Ahn and 
Mira, 1999; Brewster and Rindfuss, 2000; Engelhardt and Prskawetz, 2002): in a high female 
participation regime, working conditions are more favourable to women, allowing higher chances to 
conciliate family and job. As a result, nowadays the fertility rate is more likely to be positively 
associated with the participation rate.  
But the presence in the labor market of intensive part-time supply could induces gender 
segregation due to higher degree of availability of part-time works only in certain occupation and 
sectors while being rare in others (Ichino, Sanz de Galdeano, 2003) and does not necessarily lead to 
a widespread conciliation between roles. While for instance in Britain changes toward flexibility 
occurred in the labor market have actually limited the adaptations British women have needed to 
make to their long-term fertility aspirations (Joshi, 2002), Retherford et al. (1996) found that in 
Japan, despite an intensive part-time supply, women (especially highly educated) anyway prefer to 
leave the job after marriage. In this case, both the unattractive nature and low wages of much part-
time jobs, and the fact that tax and benefit system disincentive female full-time participation to the 
labor market, discourage conciliation between roles, favouring instead the traditional role of 
women. As a consequence, in Japan many women with higher education do not work at all, 
devoting instead their full energies to domestic duties. Part-time job is only useful to earn money to 
pay expenses related to children's education, but cannot be associated to self-fulfilment aspirations. 
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This set of theories sketched the common factors of changes occurred in fertility rates and in 
female participation in the labor market. Nowadays, the main problem women have to overcome is 
conciliation between parenthood and working participation, which may be better solved with 
specific policies implemented by the welfare state (as, for instance, availability of childcare 
services, flexible jobs and economic support to families wanting to have children). At the same 
time, we have shown how it may happen that those policies have unexpected consequences (as in 
the case of Japan): the impact of ideational change and economic reasoning depends on institutional 
and other cultural factors, which both contribute to generate diverse social and demographic 
outcomes (Billari and Wilson, 2001).  
As a consequence we generally expect that female labor force participation directly 
discourages fertility, and vice versa. At the same time, this effect can be mitigate or even reversed 
in national contexts allowing the simultaneous double presence of the woman in the family and in 
the labor market. Moreover, we also think that there exists an indirect effect of role incompatibility, 
acting through individual preferences (which gained a central role with modern changes in value 
orientation). In a highly incompatible framework, indeed, women have to choose between the two 
roles, and therefore their preferences toward the family or the working career pushes them in one 
direction or the other (Hakim, 2000, for instance, recognised the existence of three different 
categories of women: work-centred, family-centred or adaptive). On the contrary, whenever the two 
activities are not seen anymore as pure alternatives, personal preferences may play a different role 
(for instance, it is possible that more dynamic women are more active in both aspects of life). 
3.  Family policies in Italy and France 
Family policies as well as labor market structure are in Italy and France very different. In Italy, the 
rigidities which are present in the institutional structure do not facilitate the conciliation between 
motherhood and labor force participation (Del Boca, 1999). On the one hand, part-time employment 
is extremely rare, and it is often characterized by low profile engagements: women need therefore to 
choose between full-time jobs or no job at all, knowing that after quitting the job it is generally 
difficult to return (Bettio and Villa, 1998). This is an important factor leading to the particularly low 
employment rates of women (as reported by Eurostat, 2002, at the end of 2000, the employment 
rate for females is about 40% and 53% for women aged 25-49). On the other hand, the child care 
system provides poor assistance to working mothers, in terms of number of children who can 
benefit of child care services and weekly hours available, only compatible with part-time jobs. In 
fact, the child care system is highly subsidized but the local availability and the number of supplied 
daily hours are quite limited in contrast with the need of mothers, especially those in full-time 
employment (Chiuri, 2000). Del Boca et al. (2004) show that the lack of childcare alternatives is 
Giraldo, Mazzuco, Michielin 6 
 
 
 
particularly severe for children under 3, where the proportion of those children using formal child 
care arrangements is only about 6%. 
In France, conversely, the welfare system is well-known for giving great economic support 
to large families and to allow the double presence of women in both family and labor market (in 
2000, female employment rate is 70% for women aged 25-49). Firstly, French mothers receive an 
important support from the childcare system and many households can use different forms of 
childcare services (Guillot, 2002). Those offer a wide variety of care arrangement: nursery schools 
are open for 35 hours a week, free of charge, except for the lunches and care out of school hours. 
The result is that, by the age of two, 36% children attend nursery schools and the figure is nearly 
99% for children aged three to six (Letabelier, 2003). Secondly, a complex system of family 
benefits, which can be in cash or in kind are offered by the welfare state. Family allowances are 
paid to families with at least two children, up to the age of 16, there are also housing allowances, 
and childcare allowances (Letabelier, 2003). The latter are addressed only to families where both 
parents (or the lone parent) are economically active, to cover costs of childcare at home. Non-
working mothers receive also support from the welfare state which allocates relevant benefits for 
families with two children or more where the mother is not working or working only part-time 
(Afsa, 1998). This measure is called APE (Allocation parentale d’éducation) and it suspected of 
having a negative impact on female labor force participation (see Del Boca et al, 2004b). 
Finally, part-time job is widespread and about 30% of working women are employed part-
time (Eurostat 2002; Bourreau-Dubois, 2001). 
Differences between the two countries become clear looking at Table 1, where household 
income has been broken down by source and number of present children: in France large families 
receive an higher economical support from the welfare state than they do in Italy. For instance, the 
17% of households income of families with three or more children comes from “family related 
allowances” while the same figure for Italy is 2,5%. Also housing allowances have more weight in 
French households budgets.  
At the macro level, those institutional dissimilarities correspond to high differences as far as 
the fertility behaviour is concerned. Italy shares with Spain the lowest fertility level (the TFR is 
around 1.25 in 2000, see Eurostat, 2002), becoming the paradigm of lowest-low fertility countries 
(Kohler et al. 2001) whereas French TFR reaches the highest level (1.89) among the European 
Community countries (see Figure 1). Moreover, Italian fertility is mostly marital whereas in France 
the proportion of out-of-wedlock childbirths reached the value of 40% (Eurostat, 2002). 
The general impression is that in France conciliation between roles is far easier than in Italy, 
but at the same time specific policies may allow women with many children to leave the labor 
market, supported by welfare benefits. Letabelier, 2003, reported that special allowances to large  
families made the activity rate of mothers with two children fall. In Italy, instead, working women 
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have to cope with a lack of childcare service and part-time opportunities whereas not working 
women receive a poor economic support from the welfare state. 
 
Table 1: Household income shares by source and number of present children, Italy and France, 2000. Source: 
ECHP, own elaborations.  
 FRANCE 
Children 
Income 
from work 
Private 
transfer 
Unemployment 
benefits 
Family related 
allowances 
Housing 
allowances 
Old age 
benefits 
Other income 
sources 
0 81,5 3,1 3,9   2,6 2,5 4,4 4,2 
1 86,3 1,1 4,4   3,5 2,9 1,7 2,5 
2 85,7 1,1 2,7   6,6 2,5 0,7 3,0 
3+ 70,5 1,3 2,1 17,3 5,1 1,1 3,0 
TOT 82,1 1,9 3,5   5,8 3,0 2,5 3,3 
 ITALY 
Children 
Income 
from work 
Private 
transfer 
Unemployment 
benefits 
Family related 
allowances 
Housing 
allowances 
Old age 
benefits 
Other income 
sources 
0 73,8 2,0 1,3 0,4 0,1 18,0 1,8 
1 88,8 1,7 0,8 0,9 0,0   5,4 1,2 
2 88,9 1,9 1,6 1,2 0,1   3,6 1,3 
3+ 84,7 1,7 2,1 2,5 0,1   5,3 1,4 
TOT 81,2 1,9 1,3 0,9 0,1 11,1 1,6 
 
According to the theories of paragraph 2 and to the empirical evidence we have just outlined 
we can draw three major hypotheses concerning the link between female choices in fertility and job 
position in the two countries: 
1. On the impact of labor participation on fertility  
We expect that in Italy working women should have a lower propensity of having an additional 
child than non working women. On the contrary, in France, due to the high level of support 
given by the welfare state, we expect this effect to be weakened or even reversed.  
2. On the impact of having children on female participation  
Having had a child is expected to bring stronger consequences on female participation in Italy 
than in France.  
3. On female preferences for children and labor participation 
Concerning unobserved components, we expect a negative correlation in Italy (since the society 
is still very traditional, and we expect unobserved represent individual propensity to work and to 
family life) and a positive correlation in France (where heterogeneity may be viewed as a proxy 
of the dynamism of the women in respect to every life domain).  
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Figure 1: TFR and percentage of women not in the labor force in France and Italy. Source: Eurostat, 2002. 
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4. The data 
The data we use come from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), a longitudinal 
survey designed and coordinated by the Statistical Office of the European Community 
(EUROSTAT). This panel survey started in 1994 collecting yearly information for many European 
countries. Up to now we dispose of the first seven waves (from 1994 to 2000) of ECHP. A great 
advantage of ECHP is the scope for comparability among the participating countries. Besides, it 
provides up to date information on income, employment status, housing situation, education, health 
status, and personal satisfaction. One of its pitfall, instead, is the lack of retrospective information. 
Using those data we focus our attention on married or cohabiting women who already had 
the first child. We exclude from our investigation the birth of first child since it is generally 
acknowledged that the process leading to the first child widely differs than higher order childbirths. 
Moreover, we emphasize the main difference between French and Italian fertility, i.e. the proportion 
of women having at least two children is much higher in France with respect to Italy. As in Italy 
fertility is almost exclusively marital and in France out-of-wedlock childbirths are instead much 
more frequent, we consider only married women in Italy and married or cohabiting women in 
France. We restrict our attention to women aged 16 to 45.  
Table 2 shows the main characteristics of our sub-sample. The differences between the two 
countries are consistent with our expectations: although the Italian sample is older, the percentage 
of women with 3 or more children is half with respect to France. On the other hand, participation in 
the labor force is higher in France, and French working women have on average higher salaries than 
Italians. Besides, the percentage of graduated women is considerably lower in Italy, where about 1 
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out of 10 has a degree. Finally, the number of childbirths occurred in the considered time span 
(1994-2000) is higher for Italy, but this is due to an higher sample size. 
 
Table 2: Description of the sample. 
 France Italy 
 1994 2000 1994 2000 
Number of women 1731 1350 1997 1700 
Mean age 34.91 36.05 35.73 36.43 
% Married 86.1 81.6 100 100 
% with exactly 1 child 28.3 30.0 34.7 39.7 
% with exactly 2 children 44.4 44.4 48.5 46.3 
% with 3 or more children 27.2 25.6 16.8 14.1 
% working 15 hours per week or more 60.0 63.3 45.6 46.6 
% economically inactive 36.6 29.8 40.0 41.9 
Working hours per week 35.7 34.5 34.9 34.3 
Mean salary of workers (monthly, equalised 
in terms of purchasing power) 
978 1079 824 785 
Mean household income (equivalent, 
equalized in terms of purchasing power) 
13096 13330 9206 9491 
% Graduated or equivalent 22.47 31.75 7.26 10.35 
Number of childbirths (1994-2000) 959 1056 
 
5. Statistical modeling 
As previously stated, fertility and employment status are possibly endogenous variables: the 
decision on having or not a child and to quit or not the labor market are taken, reasonably, 
simultaneously. Therefore, we try to model simultaneously fertility and labor participation; we 
consider fertility as a function of both household income and female working participation, and we 
suppose the existence of some unobserved characteristic which influence both fertility choices and 
the presence of the woman in the labor market.  
5.1.  The model 
The econometric specification is therefore a simultaneous equation model (Lillard, 1993) where 
childbearing is simultaneously modelled with labor force participation decision. Childbirths are 
repeatable events, but each birth occurs within a complex decision-making strategy. The decision-
making model used here hypothesizes that women act rationally to realize a plan of desired family 
size (Becker, 1981). Since different strategies can be compatible with the same number of children, 
women can choose to act in different ways (Yamaguchi and Ferguson, 1995; Rosina, 2000). 
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Therefore, when describing fertility, information concerning the past needs to be considered in 
order to predict future behaviour.  
Concerning fertility process, the basic event of interest is a conception (of order 2 or higher) 
between time t and t+1, and therefore we model the probability of having an additional conception 
as follows:  
( ) ( ) 1321111 ,,|1 ++ +++Φ== ititititit WZXWZXYP εβββ , 
while concerning women participation in the labor market, we model the probability of working at 
time t+1: 
( ) ( ) 1322121 ,,|1 ++ +++Φ== ititititit WYXWYXZP ζγγγ , 
where )(⋅Φ  is the probit function. It is important to underline that, as shown in Table 3, in each 
equation there are some predictors specific of the process under study ( itX 1  for fertility and itX 2  for 
working), some predictors common to both equations ( itW ) and finally some predictors which refer 
to the other process causing endogeneity (in Italic in the table): in the fertility equation indeed we 
control for the working position of the women at time t, while in the female participation equation 
we consider both current parity and time to last birth. 
Among the variables included in both equations we have some proxy variables for human 
capital such educational level and work experience (years since first job, vocational courses), 
representing in the fertility equation the costs opportunity of having children (i.e. the higher the 
human capital, the higher the costs the woman has to pay for childbirth), and in the labor 
participation equation the opportunity costs of working (i.e. the higher the human capital, the better 
chances women have in the labor market).  
Another source of endogeneity comes from the specification of the error terms, consisting in 
a transitory part and an individual specific time invariant component (i.e. itiit u τε +=  and 
itiit v ξζ += ), where we allow correlation across unobserved individual specific components to 
differ from 0 (i.e., it may happen that cov(ui , vi)≠0).  
The significance and the magnitude of the heterogeneity inform us on the unobserved 
preferences underlying the two processes. A negative correlation would confirm the existence of the 
traditional contraposition between family oriented and career oriented women (Hakim, 2000). We 
expect this negative correlation in Italy, since the incompatibility of maternal and job roles is very 
strong, and therefore women need to choose between parenthood and work. On the contrary, a 
positive correlation would represent a new preference model, where more dynamic women are 
opposed to less dynamic women, dynamism affecting each dimension of life. Whenever 
incompatibility is not very strong (as for instance in France) the choice of having a child does not 
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compromise female participation in the labor market, and therefore it may happen that the ability of 
the individual of reaching his/her goals becomes of major importance, as a sort of individualistic 
ability in succeeding in each life dimension.  
We also expect a positive impact of receiving social benefits on the probability of 
childbearing, controlling for participation to labor market. This effect is likely to appear in France 
but not in Italy as the social benefits provided by the welfare state seem too poor for having any 
impact. 
 
Table 3: List of the variables included in the two equations.  
 Fertility Labor participation 
Current age of the woman X X 
Number of children X X 
Being married* X  X 
Presence of other people in the household X X 
Presence of people looking after children X X 
Length of current birth interval (i.e. age of the 
youngest child, in months) 
X X 
Length of interval between previous births  X  
Dwelling own by the household X X 
Education X X 
Being working X  
Years since first job X X 
Having worked previously   X 
Household income X  
Partner income  X 
Benefits X X 
Regional unemployment rate  X 
Having attended vocational course X X 
Bad health X X 
Being a foreigner X X 
Geographical area X X 
Personal satisfaction X X 
* for France only. 
 
6.  Results 
The results of the models are reported in tables 4-7. Firstly, we consider the results arising 
modelling separately fertility and labor force participation, then we comment the simultaneous 
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models. For the separate models we briefly present the effect of the explicative variables. For those 
variables, indeed, the coefficient estimates generally confirm our expectations.  
For fertility models, age has a negative effect on fertility with an increasing rate (reflecting a 
decreasing fecundability, in line with findings of McDonald et al., 2003). Moreover, the time 
interval since last birth and the length of the interval between last two births have a negative impact 
on the probability of a new conception (the longer the interval, the lower the probability of 
conceiving), and the higher the number of children already had, the lower the probability of 
progressing to an higher parity. All those elements underline the importance of including birth 
history information for understanding future fertility choices (Yamaguchi and Ferguson, 1995). 
Another information sheds some additional light on fertility decision: surprisingly, in both Italy and 
France the fact the children are looked after on a regular basis by someone discourages fertility. 
Probably this does not reflect the effect of availability of childcare, but the incapacity of the family 
of directly looking after their own children. Concerning the existence of geographical differentials, 
in Italy women from the South have a higher propensity to have children. Finally, both in France 
and in Italy foreigner women show higher fertility rates. 
Even the results of participation equation are in line with literature: age has a positive effect 
but at a declining rate and low education has a negative effect. Besides, the partner’s income has a 
negative effect on participation, probably because it is less necessary (from the economic point of 
view) for women with a “rich” partner to participate to the labor force. Moreover, having attained a 
vocational course has a positive effect while regional unemployment rate and bad health status both 
have a negative impact on participation to the labor force. Notice that if there is an unpaid person 
looking after children, females are more likely to work (confirming previous interpretation of the 
real meaning of this variable), and in Italy women living in large families have a higher 
participation rate. Turning to the perception of personal wellbeing, satisfaction with main activity 
and with financial situation are positively associated with participation rate, whereas satisfaction 
with leisure time is negatively associated.  
We can now turn to the main interest of this paper, i.e. the reciprocal impact of fertility choices 
on labor participation and vice versa, discussing in detail the results concerning our hypotheses.  
1. On the impact of labor participation on fertility  
Conversely to expectations, the effect of the working status is positive for Italian women, while in 
France the impact of female participation on fertility depends on the number of children already 
had. Working status has a negative effect on childbearing but only for mothers with at least two 
children. 
The model confirms also our expectation that receiving benefits has a positive impact on 
fertility in France but in the simultaneous model this effect fades away. This suggests that the effect 
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of benefits on fertility interacts with the working status. In Italy, instead, there is no effect of 
benefits on fertility (whereas, household income has a positive but weak impact on fertility 
choices).  
2. On the impact of having children on female participation  
As expected, the number of children has a negative impact on female participation in the labor 
market. We hypothesised a stronger effect in Italy than in France, but this is not confirmed by the 
model, probably because the main difference between Italy and France concerning female 
participation does not directly depend on the number of children, but on the general level of female 
participation. 
Also the effect of the time span since last birth is high, then mothers are less likely to 
participate short after the last childbirth. 
Finally, even the role of family benefits plays opposite effect in the two countries: having social 
support has a positive impact for Italy and negative for France. Again, Italian mothers seem to 
choose to participate to the labor market when the economic situation is critical (support from the 
welfare state is only given in extremely rare cases).  
3. On female preferences for children and labor participation 
When we turn to simultaneous models results do not change dramatically as far as it concerns the 
significance and magnitude of the parameters, apart few exceptions. Moreover, there is significant 
additional information concerning the correlation between heterogeneities.  
In France, for instance, the parameter associated to welfare benefits is not significant 
anymore in the fertility equation, as well as the simple condition of participating to the labor market 
(however, the interaction with the number of children is still significant). In other words, the 
positive effect of receiving benefits is absorbed by the negative effect of working, which have a 
particular strong impact for women with more than one child. Probably, due to the particular system 
of family benefits, which addressed special support (APE) to couples where one parent quit his/her 
job for rearing children. 
Moreover, the unobserved heterogeneity components are positively correlated, confirming 
the existence of a new preference model, where more dynamic women are opposed to less dynamic 
women, dynamism affecting each dimension of life. In this context, indeed, the choice of having a 
child does not compromise female participation in the labor market, and therefore the ability of the 
individual of reaching his/her goals becomes of major importance.  
In Italy, instead, we find a negative correlation between unobserved preferences for fertility 
and job career, whereas the working status has now a positive impact on fertility. The sign of the 
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correlation across unobservables does not surprise: given the incompatibility between the two 
careers, women have to choose one of the two roles, and their preferences strongly impact on the 
outcomes in the two life domain. Instead, more surprising is the positive role of female participation 
in the labor market on fertility. The reason, however, can easily be understood thinking that we are 
dealing with Italian mothers, and that probably if they are still working at the time of the interview, 
they succeeded in solving incompatibility between the two careers. In other words, whenever 
conciliation is possible, having a job seems to help fertility decision. 
 
Table 4: Results from fertility and labor force participation equations (separate estimates), Italy. 
 Fertility equation Participation equation 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Age -0,117 0,000 -0,019 0,122 
Age (squared) -0,010 0,000 -0,005 0,000 
N° children -0,691 0,000 -0,226 0,000 
Others -0,155 0,381 0,398 0,007 
Span -0,005 0,000 0,003 0,004 
Prespan -0,009 0,000   
Medium education -0,052 0,772 -1,074 0,000 
Low education -0,047 0,808 -2,083 0,000 
Working 0,168 0,615   
Working*H. income 0,000 0,998   
Working*N° ch. -0,164 0,455   
Benefits 0,000 0,177 0,074 0,065 
Household income 0,020 0,162   
Partner income   -0,032 0,000 
Others looking after children -0,275 0,129 1,257 0,000 
Unemployment rate (regional)   -0,008 0,525 
Vocational course   1,791 0,000 
Foreign 0,486 0,011 -0,311 0,207 
Bad health 0,166 0,606 -0,500 0,011 
Sat. Main activity   0,860 0,000 
Sat. Financ. Sit. -0,091 0,378 0,425 0,000 
Sat. Leisure time 0,047 0,637 -0,794 0,000 
Centre -0,112 0,418 -0,149 0,254 
South 0,249 0,044 -0,472 0,116 
Household owner of dwelling 0,085 0,382 -0,052 0,553 
Years since first job 0,001 0,907 0,097 0,000 
Worked previously   -0,903 0,000 
Constant 2,513 0,000 2,085 0,000 
ρ (rho) 0 (fixed)   
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Table 5: Results from fertility and labor force participation equations (separate estimates), France. 
 Fertility equation Participation equation 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Age -0,161 0,000 0,011 0,368 
Age (squared) -0,012 0,000 -0,005 0,000 
N° children -0,561 0,000 -0,413 0,000 
Others 0,727 0,097 0,222 0,452 
Married 0,159 0,147 -0,099 0,308 
Span -0,005 0,001 0,004 0,000 
Prespan 0,000 0,015   
Medium education -0,217 0,048 -0,462 0,000 
Low education -0,338 0,017 -0,906 0,000 
Working 0,443 0,208   
Working*H. income 0,000 0,582   
Working*N° ch. -0,371 0,017   
Benefits 0,000 0,094 -0,212 0,000 
Household income 0,000 0,857   
Partner income   -0,011 0,002 
Others looking after children -0,325 0,029 0,810 0,000 
Unemployment rate (regional)   -0,057 0,000 
Vocational course   0,514 0,000 
Foreign 0,456 0,003 0,046 0,770 
Bad health -0,150 0,650   
Sat. Main activity   0,525 0,000 
Sat. Financ. Sit. -0,103 0,307 0,335 0,000 
Sat. Leisure time 0,091 0,353 -0,673 0,000 
Paris -0,104 0,369 0,105 0,296 
Household owner of dwelling -0,344 0,001 0,446 0,000 
Years since first job 0,011 0,360 0,028 0,000 
Worked previously   0,075 0,336 
Constant 4,006 0,000 1,565 0,000 
ρ (rho) 0 (fixed)   
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Table 6: Results from fertility and labor force participation equations (simultaneous estimates), Italy. 
 Fertility equation Participation equation 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Age -0,046 0,000 -0,010 0,171 
Age (squared) -0,003 0,000 -0,003 0,000 
N° children -0,233 0,005 -0,135 0,000 
Others -0,060 0,474 0,226 0,009 
Span -0,003 0,000 0,002 0,004 
Prespan -0,004 0,000   
Medium education 0,087 0,331 -0,625 0,000 
Low education 0,173 0,106 -1,218 0,000 
Working 0,514 0,018   
Working*H. income -0,002 0,776   
Working*N° ch. -0,109 0,262   
Benefits -0,056 0,120 0,044 0,045 
Household income 0,012 0,063   
Partner income   -0,018 0,000 
Others looking after children -0,222 0,015 0,730 0,000 
Unemployment rate (regional)   -0,005 0,508 
Vocational course   0,992 0,000 
Foreign 0,246 0,009 -0,188 0,180 
Bad health 0,108 0,458   
Sat. Main activity   0,503 0,000 
Sat. Financ. Sit. -0,093 0,073 0,244 0,000 
Sat. Leisure time 0,094 0,056 -0,459 0,000 
Centre -0,005 0,941 -0,096 0,207 
South 0,174 0,003 -0,277 0,113 
Household owner of dwelling 0,039 0,403 -0,026 0,613 
Years since first job -0,005 0,306 0,056 0,000 
Worked previously   -0,510 0,000 
Constant 0,218 0,443 1,164 0,000 
ρ (rho) -0,229 0,015   
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Table 7: Results from fertility and labor force participation equations (simultaneous estimates), France. 
 Fertility equation Participation equation 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Age -0,068 0,000 0,006 0,380 
Age (squared) -0,005 0,000 -0,003 0,000 
N° children -0,294 0,000 -0,252 0,000 
Others 0,441 0,039 0,140 0,405 
Married 0,049 0,384 -0,054 0,360 
Span -0,002 0,002 0,002 0,000 
Prespan -0,0003 0,010   
Medium education -0,173 0,002 -0,270 0,000 
Low education -0,277 0,001 -0,536 0,000 
Working -0,393 0,211   
Working*H. income 0,004 0,508   
Working*N° ch. -0,156 0,024   
Benefits -0,005 0,809 -0,118 0,000 
Household income -0,002 0,759   
Partner income   -0,005 0,001 
Others looking after children -0,081 0,338 0,480 0,000 
Unemployment rate (regional)   -0,035 0,000 
Vocational course   0,290 0,000 
Foreign 0,229 0,003 0,029 0,757 
Bad health -0,162 0,314   
Sat. Main activity   0,318 0,000 
Sat. Financ. Sit. -0,010 0,857 0,199 0,000 
Sat. Leisure time -0,018 0,761 -0,401 0,000 
Paris -0,048 0,390 0,069 0,254 
Household owner of dwelling -0,123 0,027 0,265 0,000 
Years since first job 0,008 0,153 0,017 0,000 
Worked previously   0,041 0,373 
Constant 1,934 0,000 0,927 0,000 
ρ (rho) 0,370 0,021   
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7. Conclusion 
Empirical results partially confirm our expectations and, to our view, identify some effect of family 
policies in France. The most relevant result is the double impact of benefits on French women’s 
decisions on fertility and work: this seems to be the effect of APE which was enhanced in 1994 
(exactly at the beginning of our ECHP survey). The effect is indirectly positive on fertility since it 
passes through the abandonment of labor market by women with at least two children. Therefore 
there is an indirect effect on gender equity: APE is addressed only to couples where one parent quits 
his/her job for rearing children and, provided that mothers will quit more than fathers, the final 
result is a decline in the activity rate of mothers, as also noted by Letabelier (2002) and Del Boca et 
al (2004b). Thus our analysis suggests that APE has a double effect on fertility (positive) and 
gender equity (negative).  
The Italian situation is even more complicated: activity rate of women is rather low but this is not 
associated to a high fertility simply because the fertility levels of non-working women is not higher 
than that of working women. The lack of adequate childcare services puts several time constraints 
on working women whereas the poor economic support from the welfare state makes one-income 
families (i.e. where women do not work) budget constrained. As highlighted by our analysis, time 
constraints are likely to be most important. 
 It can seem odd that working status has a positive effect  where unobserved heterogeneities 
are negatively correlated (in Italy) and a negative effect where unobservables are positively 
correlated (in France). This oddity is related to the main limitation of models accounting for 
unobserved heterogeneities. Usually they are interpreted as a measure of attitudes toward the focal 
behaviour even though there is no particular reason for not considering them as the results of other 
unobserved characteristics. For instance, we learn from the theory of planned behaviour (Fishbein 
and Ajzen, 1975) that attitudes toward a behaviour interacts with the subjective norms and the 
perceived behavioural control in shaping the individuals’ intention regarding the behaviour, which 
are also unobserved. 
 In our case, we suggest that in determining the correlation between the unobserved 
heterogeneities, the perceived behavioural control  (PBC) has a key role: the PBC is the degree of 
belief in one’s ability to perform the behaviour.  
In this case, the different values of correlation between unobservables would reflect a 
different perception of compatibility between mothering and working in the two countries, with 
Italian women more prone to believe that conciliating motherhood and labor force participation is a 
quite difficult task, while French women perceive an higher compatibility between the two roles. 
This different perception probably interacts with different subjective norms regarding performing 
both the behaviours (childbearing and working). 
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 On the light of this study we suggest some policies implications. First of all, a “family-
friendly” approach, like the French one, considerably reduces the level of incompatibility between 
fertile and job career and gives the opportunity to active women to reach their desired level of 
fertility. As shown by Del Boca (1999), the provision of childcare services plays an important role 
on this issue as well as increasing part-time job opportunities. Secondly, we saw that in such a 
context job and fertility preferences are positively associated, thus policies aiming at increasing 
female activity rate can indirectly raise fertility level, provided that working women are not time 
constrained. On the other hand, providing benefits to non-working mothers can have a collateral 
effect raising both fertility and female inactivity rate. Such a measure is therefore not advisable for 
Italy where female activity rate is already low. Finally, we suggest that raising compatibility 
between fertility and female labor force participation seems to be even a cultural issue and not 
merely an economic one.  
 Perception of high incompatibility between female work career and family formation can 
refrain women from exploiting their desired fertility. Changing this perception can have a positive 
effect on both fertility and female labor force participation. 
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